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Abstract: 
This paper seeks to establish the limits in Heidegger’s account of how human beings are 
with one another in the world. Toward this end, we will examine Heidegger’s finding that 
human beings exist in the world as care, as a finite movement that needs to seek the 
perseverance and growth of its being. We will be brought to find that, in Heidegger’s 
thought, this finite movement is essentially worldly and holistic, and that this means that 
the essential formal structure of human relations is that of reciprocity. The form and limit 
of such relations of reciprocity will be pursued by examining Heidegger’s account of how 
these relations are lived in inauthentic and authentic ways. In the case of the former, we 
will find that human relations abide by a logic of tit-for-tat. In the latter case, however, 
such relations of reciprocity will be seen to open onto and foster the growth of the well-
being of the world as a whole. In closing, we will ask whether Heidegger’s account of our 
finite movement in the world can accommodate relations of non-reciprocity.   
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I.Introduction: The meaning of Care
This paper seeks to establish the limits in Heidegger’s account of how human beings are 
with one another in the world. Toward this end, we will examine Heidegger’s finding that 
human beings exist in the world as care, as a finite movement that needs to seek the 
perseverance and growth of its being. We will be brought to find that, in Heidegger’s 
thought, this finite movement is essentially worldly and holistic, and that this means that 
the essential formal structure of human relations is that of reciprocity. The form and limit 
of such relations of reciprocity will be pursued by examining Heidegger’s account of how 
they are lived in inauthentic and authentic ways. In the case of the former, we will find that 
human relations abide by a logic of tit-for-tat. In the latter case, however, such relations of 
reciprocity will be seen to open onto and foster the growth of the well-being of the world 
as a whole. In closing, we will ask whether Heidegger’s account of our finite movement in 
the world can accommodate relations of non-reciprocity.
For Heidegger, the matter of who Dasein is stands as an essential structural element 
to Dasein’s way of being in the world. (Heidegger 1962, 149-153). Dasein is in the world 
with others as care, as a finite, insecure and uncertain presence, which is always at risk of 
falling away into nothing, and which therefore needs to continuously act for the sake of 
its own perseverance and growth. As a result, all of Dasein’s actions serve as symptoms 
of its care for the perseverance of its own being1. Who Dasein is, then, is what Heidegger 
calls a mineness -a finite (incomplete), self-indexing movement that is in the world with 
others (68, 78). Dasein is thrown into the world as this mineness, this finite, self-indexing 
movement, such that it has to be this mineness (78). Thus, because Dasein has to exist 
in such a way that all of its actions speak out who it is, Dasein is necessarily responsible 
for its existence. Mineness means that Dasein necessarily bears responsibility for the 
situation into which it has been thrown, and for how it takes up this situation in the future.
That being said, the concept of mineness is not a trace of egoism on Heidegger’s 
part.  Heidegger understands the essential condition of all appearing -the finite, temporal 
movement of being- and the beings that appear according to this phenomenality, as 
standing in a relation of mutual need. Heidegger understands the essential condition of all 
appearing presence -the finite, temporal movement of being- and the beings that appear 
according to this phenomenality, as standing in a relation of mutual need. Being needs 
beings in order to appear and, in turn, beings need being in order to become who they 
are. Given the reciprocal need between being and beings, Dasein also exists in a relation 
1 For a discussion of the relation between incompleteness and movement in Heidegger, see 
Backman 2005, 244-245; and carter 2014, 483-486.
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of mutual need with those others with whom it shares certain contexts of meaning in 
the world.  As a result, when Dasein undertakes this or that act for the sake of its own 
potentiality-for-being, it does not act merely, or even primarily, for itself.  Because of the 
shared contexts of significance in which my potentiality-for-being is necessarily steeped, 
when I attend a public talk being given by a friend, for example, my  act is neither merely 
for me -it is not egotistic- nor wholly for the other, but for our shared relation in the world 
-it is out of concern for the meaning of our shared existence in the world.  
For Heidegger, then, the mineness of Dasein can be neither ego-centric, nor oriented 
around the other, but is worldly and holistic. As the presence of Dasein’s mineness rests 
in the reciprocal relation of the world’s manifestation in which it is caught, Dasein’s 
mineness is itself caught, is itself nothing other than this reciprocal relation to the world. 
In its mineness, Dasein is not primarily oriented around itself or the other, but around 
the world, and, more specifically, around the particular worlds in whose contexts of 
significance it has been thrown, and which it must take up in its own way. As a result, in its 
mineness, Dasein necessarily suffers and enacts a reciprocal relation to all of those with 
whom it shares a context of significance.  
Dasein’s mineness is therefore a relation to those others with whom it shares a world. 
And this sharing of worlds happens as a reciprocal relation. As we will see, this does not 
mean that Dasein only relates to those who have done something advantageous for it, but 
it does mean that it can only relate to those who have the potential to suffer and enact the 
contexts of significance in which it has been thrown. As will come forward in more detail 
later, even though Dasein’s mineness is not limited to a mere tit-for-tat, this mineness is 
not an immoderate or gratuitous relation or action, but remains one of reciprocity. For it 
follows from Heidegger’s analysis of movement as the presence of Dasein’s potentiality, 
as the reciprocal relation between its suffering and enacting that opens the world’s 
ecstatic manifestation, that those Dasein with whom I share a context of significance, are 
already present, and have already done something for me, simply in their potentiality-
for-being, before any objective effecting of this or that. Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s 
potentiality as the reciprocal relation between the suffering and enacting of its essential 
relation to being, means that Dasein’s suffering, in its inner relation with enacting, is itself 
always already an action, which brings to presence the world’s network of relations on 
which I myself depend for my self-perseverance and self-growth. The meaning of the 
finite movement of care, as begins to show itself here in the structural feature of Dasein’s 
mineness, would need to be further specified as this finite movement of reciprocity. 
Finitude, then, would consist in suffering and enacting these reciprocal relations of the 
world.
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2. Inauthentic Relations of Reciprocity
On account of this, our care discloses the world in a carefree manner. As we have seen, 
because the mineness in question is an essential and inescapable structural element of 
Dasein’s finite way of being in the world, Dasein is bound to exist this mineness in one 
way or another -in an  authentic (eigentlich) or inauthentic (uneigentlich) manner (68, 
78). It is because this existence is always experienced as mine that I can either take up my 
existence (authenticity), or I can make an effort to neglect it, to fall away or take flight from 
it in an ever-ongoing series of distractions (inauthenticity) (68, 78). In either case, Dasein 
is present to itself (186, 220). The finite movement that structures this presence simply 
means that Dasein cannot be present to itself in a permanent and immobile manner; it 
means Dasein can only ever be present to itself by maintaining itself in its incomplete 
movement toward itself, by moving into its own finite potentiality.  
The aforementioned loss of distance from the world as such means that Dasein 
forgets its own unique role and responsibility in disclosing entities, and simply lets 
itself be carried along by the anonymous and average, ready-made norms and attitudes 
into which it finds itself thrown in its everyday existence. It is because our care is not 
permanent and immobile, but is determined by the incomplete movement of being that 
Dasein tends to get absorbed in the objects of its care (Heidegger 2005, 43). In so doing, 
Dasein covers over its mineness; it forgets its own role and responsibility in the way it 
goes about its existence, in the way it understands the world and the way it conducts itself 
therein (Heidegger 1962, 60). Rather than acknowledge its responsibility for its existence, 
in an inauthentic way of existing, Dasein takes care to unload that responsibility onto the 
anonymous and average views and forms of conduct that it finds already at work in the 
situation into which it has been thrown (164-168).
As the incomplete movement of our concern happens as a thrown-projectedness, 
however, Heidegger does not view inauthenticity as a moral shortcoming or failure on 
the part of Dasein, but as an inevitable aspect of the essential structure of its being (68).
The they is an existentiale of Dasein (168). Inauthenticity is as inevitable as Dasein’s 
thrownness and projectedness; and like them, for Heidegger, inauthenticity does not ever 
entirely go away, but, as we will see, can merely be modified (68). Thrown into a world 
not of its own choosing, Dasein necessarily begins its existence by assuming the beliefs 
and habits of those it all of a sudden finds itself surrounded by2. What is important for 
Heidegger is not that Dasein simply falls in line with the watered down (levelled down) 
2 164-165, 312. Frederick Olafson speaks to this point in an especially clear manner. See OlafsOn 
1998, 38-39.
99 
DIFFERENZ. AÑO 5, NÚMERO 4: 
JULIO DE 2018. ISSN 2386-4877, pp. 95-109
and generally accepted view of the time, but the sheer fact that one simply assumes, and 
gets absorbed in, this or that view (Heidegger 1962, 164-165, 221-224, 312-313; OlafsOn 
1998, 36). One could assume the views of one’s parents, of the Christian tradition in which 
one is brought up, or the outlook of the bohemian artist, of the secular ‘free thinker,’ or 
of the anarchist -it matters not. So far as Heidegger’s view of inauthenticity is concerned, 
what matters is that Dasein does not maintain a distance and measure with respect to 
these interpretations of the world from their basis in the finite movement of Dasein’s 
being, and that Dasein does not therefore disclose them from its mineness, from its own 
unique situation, and so does not take responsibility for them.    
On account of this our care discloses the world in a carefree manner. Forgetting the 
incomplete movement that distances and draws entities into relation, that gives them 
their proper measure, our care becomes carefree in that it becomes absorbed in the 
objects of its concern to such an extent that the views into which it has been thrown are 
understood as simply the way things are, as self-evident, secure, and certain (Heidegger 
1999, 80). This being the case, I find that I myself do not need to disclose things, but 
only to disclose things as someone of this particular understanding normally would. In 
this case, my disclosure of the world is not authentically carried out from me myself, but 
indirectly through the they. My disclosure of the world is not accomplished as I myself 
need to, but as ‘one’ would, as anyone and everyone would in this situation, according to 
what is generally accepted as normal or appropriate at the time (164-165).
The aforementioned loss of distance from the world as such, as we’ve seen, means 
that Dasein forgets its own unique role and responsibility in disclosing entities, and 
simply lets itself be carried along by the anonymous and average, ready-made norms and 
attitudes into which it finds itself thrown in its everyday existence. As a result of this 
loss of distance from the finite movement of the world, Heidegger maintains that Dasein 
finds itself dispersed in the relations between things in the world (Heidegger, 2001, 90-
91). Dispersed in the relations between things, as Heidegger notes, Dasein begins to 
determine who it is, and how it measures its self-growth, not according to the incomplete 
movement of its being, but in terms of its position and standing in relation to other beings 
and things in the world, as determined by the norms and attitudes of the they (Heidegger 
1962, 163-164). Heidegger refers to this inclination to care for and manage our distance 
from other entities within the world as our distantiality (164-166). In taking care of 
entities in the world, then, Dasein is concerned for its position and standing in relation to 
these entities, as dictated by the norms and attitudes of the crowd (163-165). Dasein here 
views its relations in the world with others in terms of success and failure, advantage and 
disadvantage, superiority and inferiority (Heidegger, 2001, 75-78).  
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When Dasein relates to the world, itself, and others in an inauthentic manner, then,
there is constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether that 
difference is merely one that is to be evened out, whether one’s own Dasein 
has lagged behind the Others and wants to catch up in relationship to them, 
or whether one’s Dasein already has some priority over them and sets out 
to keep them suppressed (Heidegger, 1962, 163-164). 
In an inauthentic relation to the world, Dasein sees others and things merely in terms of 
how they can serve one’s quest for success and superiority in the world. In inauthenticity, 
then, the finite movement of the reciprocal relation of the world would be articulated 
according to a logic of tit-for-tat. One would treat well and do things for those who it would 
be appropriate for one to treat well according to one’s assumed station in existence: those 
who have in the past, or who in the future can possibly provide me with an advantage, 
who can aid me in my desire for success in this or that facet of my existence -in my desire 
to be an artist, to be of a certain social standing, etc. Those who are not normally seen as 
providing such potential benefits, those whose beliefs, values, and conducts do not align 
with our own, such that they do not appear to be of any potential use to one’s desire for 
success, would not need to be treated with such favour.
As this inauthentic way of relating to others out of concern for the success of my 
potentiality-for-being occurs within Dasein’s dispersal into the relations that obtain 
between things in the world, in the endless shifting of things in the referential relations in 
which they stand, this reciprocal tit-for-tat way of relating to others stands as an inauthentic 
temporalizing of Dasein’s originary temporality. Heidegger regards this inauthentic 
temporality as the aforementioned objective (calendar) time, time as an anonymous 
series of discrete now-points (377). As such, this objective time involves covering over 
and eluding our familiarity with the finite movement of our being, in favour of an endless 
(infinite) attempt to solidify and guarantee the success of one’s potentiality-for-being. The 
finite movement of reciprocal relations in the world, enacted in an inauthentic manner, 
therefore stands as an endless need for greater and greater success and superiority, a 
need for an ever-increasing strangle-hold over oneself, others, and the world, and so 
an ever-increasing instrumentalization of oneself, others, and the world at large. As this 
endlessly increasing instrumentalization of the world only serves to further the dispersal 
of Dasein that gives rise to it, however, the success of this instrumentalization, of this 
logic of tit-for-tat, is its failure, its inherent inability to satisfy itself in its relations in the 
world. In this sense, Dasein’s relaxed, carefree relation to the world is not without its 
own inner torment. Based as it is in Dasein’s attempt to disguise and evade the finite 
movement of its being, this mounting need for ever-new heights of success, and for the 
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instrumentalization of others, is itself a way in which Dasein attempts to distort and evade 
the incomplete movement of its being in the world.
The ontological condition for Dasein’s modification of this inauthentic understanding of 
the way it is in the world lies in the incomplete movement of its being. It is because of the 
finite movement of being that beings are given to inevitably err and make mistakes in their 
respective interpretations of the world. And it is because of these (mis)interpretations, 
and because objects themselves can occasionally break down and falter, and so inevitably 
fail to live up to our interpretations at some point or other, that Dasein no longer feels so 
carefree and secure in its dispersal amidst things in the world, and so Dasein finds itself 
alerted to its being as a whole. By Dasein’s being as a whole, of course, we mean the 
finite movement of Dasein’s being, which distances and gathers beings into relation, into 
their true measure, with which they have been united from the beginning, from their first 
having been thrown into the world. When Dasein is in the world in an authentic way, as 
we will come to see, Dasein understands the incomplete and needy movement according 
to which it is in the world with others. In so doing, Dasein understands the historical 
situation into which it has been thrown from the irreducibly finite movement of its own 
being, and so Dasein comes to understand its historical situation as that for which it must 
assume responsibility.
3.Re-turning to Oneself and Others: Anxiety and The Call of Conscience
To be authentic, Dasein must first be alerted, it must first be attuned to authenticity as 
a possibility of its being. This occurs through a breakdown in the normal functioning 
of the objects that one uses, which sends Dasein to question how it itself must be in 
order for such breakdowns and instability to be possible (105). In Being and Time, the 
fundamental attunement or mood in which Dasein finds itself quite all of a sudden torn 
from its everyday dispersal in objects and sent back toward the finitude of its existence is 
that of anxiety (Angst). In anxiety, the referential relations of use fall away (232). Entities 
within the world, as a result, suddenly have no significance, which leaves Dasein all of a 
sudden feeling exposed, insecure, and unstable (232). In anxiety, Dasein is overcome by 
a feeling that, contrary to the prior comforts provided by its relations with things, it is in 
truth not at home in the world.  
As anxiety is undergone in the collapse of the significance of objects in the world, 
Heidegger maintains that what one is anxious about is “nothing and nowhere within-the-
world” (231). As Heidegger continues,
[t]he obstinacy of the ‘nothing and nowhere within-the-world’ means as 
102 
MAX SCHAEFER
THE LIMITS OF CARE IN HEIDEGGER: SELF-INTEREST AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE WORLD
a phenomenon that the world as such is that in the face of which one has 
anxiety. The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the ‘nothing 
and nowhere’, does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that 
entities within-the-world are of so little importance in themselves that on 
the basis of this insignificance of what is within-the-world, the world in its 
world hood is all that still obtrudes itself (231).
In anxiety, the falling away of the world’s significance can be likened to a sudden 
turning off of the lights, to a darkening on account of which, as Heidegger notes, “there is 
emphatically ‘nothing’ to see, though the very world itself is still ‘there,’ and ‘there’ more 
obtrusively” (234). For Heidegger, then, “[w]hat oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it 
the summation of everything present-at-hand; it is rather the possibility of the ready-to-
hand in general; that is to say, it is the world itself” (231). As the significance of entities 
within the world in terms of which we normally understand who we are falls away, anxiety 
sends Dasein back upon
its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes 
Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that 
understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities… Anxiety makes 
manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being 
-that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of 
itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free-for (propensio 
in…) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility 
which it always is (i.e. 232).
For Heidegger, then, anxiety is experienced as a call, as a call of conscience. Since in 
anxiety Dasein finds itself forsaken by the significance of things and by the everyday chit-
chat in which it found some comfort and distraction (322), this call calls in silence, as a 
silence that reminds Dasein of the finite movement of its being. The call of conscience 
is silent in that it does not say any-thing, but simply the transcendence of the finite 
temporality that gathers beings into relation with one another in the world3. In this way, 
the call of conscience simply says that beings are finite, that beings are by virtue of the 
finite, relational movement of their being, which determines their potentiality (69-70).
The call of conscience that calls the self is its own Dasein, our own “bare” thatness, our 
own inevitable feeling of anxiety and uncanniness at our realization that we have been 
inescapably abandoned to the relative nullity of the world (Heidegger, 1962, 321). In this 
sense, the self calls itself. “Dasein is at the same time both the caller and the one to whom 
3 For a more detailed study of the silent call of language, see WeBB 2009, 69-70.
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the appeal is made” (320). But as “the call is precisely something which we ourselves have 
neither planned for nor voluntarily performed”, Heidegger notes that the caller of the call 
is indeterminate -“‘[i]t’ calls, as Heidegger says, and it calls “against our expectations and 
even against our will” (320). Ultimately, “[t]he call comes from me and yet from beyond 
me” (320). This can be understood from our analysis of our finite movement as the 
reciprocal relation of the world’s ecstatic manifestation. My Dasein, this indeterminate 
caller, stands as my necessarily reciprocal relation with the relative nullity or alterity of my 
being. As per the movement of this reciprocal relation, the call comes from me and yet 
beyond, as the innermost nullity that opens me to my potentiality-for-being. The call is 
thus present to me as the finite movement of my Dasein’s being.
Heidegger states that the “call reaches him who wants to be brought back” (316). In 
anxiety, then, the self finds itself calling itself back to the finite movement at the basis of its 
being. The call, in this sense, is the self’s Dasein calling it back to its inherent understanding 
of the finite movement of its being, which makes possible all of its possibilities. The call 
brings the self back to the incomplete movement that it inevitably is, and that it cannot 
avoid being. This finite movement can be understood as what Heidegger regards as 
Dasein’s inherent being-guilty. Dasein is guilty, not because of something it has done 
or failed to do according to inner or outer norms, but “simply in the way it is,” as this 
inevitably incomplete movement. As Heidegger observes, 
[t]he common sense of the ‘they’ knows only the satisfying of manipulable 
rules and public norms and the failure to satisfy them. It reckons up 
infractions of them and tries to balance them off. It has slunk away from 
its ownmost Being-guilty so as to be able to talk more loudly about making 
‘mistakes’ (334). 
The call calls the self back to its ownmost potentiality-for-being by calling it back to 
this finite movement, to this being-guilty, according to which the self necessarily forgets 
the null basis of the historical situation into which it has been thrown, and which it must 
take up in the future.  
If we are to take seriously the incompleteness of this movement, then, with Heidegger, 
it must be noted that, when the self hears the call of conscience, the self cannot simply 
choose to have a conscience, as this would presume that the conscience in question 
is something that can be completely grasped and possessed as a property (334). In its 
potentiality, Dasein always already has a conscience in an incomplete way, and, in hearing 
and understanding that the silent call of its conscience is calling it back to the nullity of 
its facticity, the self can now want to have a conscience (334). That is, in understanding 
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the call of conscience, the self understands that, as per the incomplete movement of 
its care, it is necessarily guilty, that it has necessarily assumed the norms and habits of 
the historical tradition into which it has been thrown, and so has not chosen to take this 
tradition up from the nullity of its being. But in understanding the call of conscience, it can 
now want to make this choice, it can now choose to “make this choice,” to make possible 
its authentic potentiality. As Heidegger describes “Dasein’s most primordial potentiality 
as Being-guilty” (334), to be sure, this authentic understanding of the finite movement of 
Dasein’s being is not an overcoming or even mitigation of its guilt -it is not its salvation- 
but it does allow the self to understand rather flee this inevitable incompleteness, and 
so to avoid potential complications and hazards that can and do arise from attempting to 
overstep one’s limits and impose one’s will on one’s existence, from attempting to reduce 
it to ontic measures of success and failure, good and evil, in a vain and counter-productive 
attempt at control and security. As Heidegger writes, in wanting to take up the guilt into 
which one has been thrown, Dasein “is ready to be appealed to,” it is ready to suffer and 
enact its potentiality-for-being as it shows itself from itself, in its basis in the incomplete 
movement of our care (334).      
In authentically wanting to have a conscience, in wanting to take up its heritage from its 
basis in the nullity of its being, Heidegger says that the self resolutely anticipates its end, 
and in this sense stands in an authentic being-toward-its-end (i.e. death). The nullity that 
speaks itself out in the call of conscience gives the self to understand that the basis of its 
possibilities rests in this non-being, in this, to use Heidegger’s tortured phrase, possibility 
of the impossibility of any existence at all on the part of its Dasein (307, 289, 293-294). 
Contrary to our everyday understanding, then, for the human self, death, the possibility of 
impossibility, is not first and foremost an actuality, something that will happen to one at 
some indeterminate point in the future, but is Dasein’s most essential possibility; it is that 
with which Dasein is united from the very beginning of its existence, that which opens 
its possibilities for being in the world, and so that to which it relates at every moment of 
its existence (294, 296). Death is “that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-
relational, and which is not to be outstripped [unuberholdbare]” (294). In authentically 
being towards its death, the self thus understands the heart of its potentiality-for-being, 
it understands its potentiality-for-being as a whole (303). In authentically being-towards-
death, the self returns to its wholeness, not in the sense of grasping itself completely and 
perfectly, but in the sense of understanding its ownmost potentiality-for-being from its 
basis in the nullity of its being, from the incomplete movement of its being. Dasein’s being 
toward its death is not non-relational in that it completely negates Dasein’s relations to 
others altogether, but in that Dasein can authentically come to be who it is as a being in 
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the world with others only on its own, in its wanting to have a conscience.  
Dasein’s authentic being towards its death is thus a shift away from relating to others 
in terms of the they-self, in terms of the anonymous and average assumptions on the part 
of the crowd as to how one should relate to others -in terms of stereotypes, economic 
calculations- towards authentically relating toward others from the finite movement of its 
mineness -from the finite movement of my own self-responsibility. As Heidegger writes, 
authentic disclosedness [in resolutely anticipating one’s end] modifies with 
equal primordiality both the way in which the ‘world’ is discovered…and the 
way in which the Dasein-with of Others is disclosed (344). 
In keeping with this, Heidegger notes that
[f]ree for its ownmost possibilities, which are determined by the end and 
so are understood as finite [endliche], Dasein dispels the danger that it 
may, by its own finite understanding of existence, fail to recognize that it is 
getting outstripped by the existence-possibilities of Others, or rather that it 
may explain these possibilities wrongly and force them back upon its own, 
so that it may divest itself of its ownmost factical existence. As the non-
relational possibility, death individualizes -but only in such a manner that, 
as the possibility which his not to be outstripped, it makes Dasein, as Being-
with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of others (308-
309)
What this means is that, in authentically being towards its death, the self is freed 
from its everyday way of relating to others as they are seen by the they, as things that 
are viewed in terms of how they can benefit or not-benefit one’s desire for success in 
effecting one’s potentiality-for-being. By authentically anticipating one’s end, and thereby 
breaking up this inauthentic relation to others via the they, Dasein “guards itself against 
falling back behind itself, or behind the potentliaity-for-being which it has understood. 
It guards itself against ‘becoming too old for its victories’ (Nietzsche)” (308). That is, by 
diminishing one’s ties to the they, and its aspirations for success and superiority, one’s 
resolute anticipation of one’s end frees one up from becoming overly stuck in one’s 
ways, in these presumably static ways of the they, which fail to take the specificity of 
each situation into consideration, and so leave one lingering too long in ways that, while 
successful in the past, have since fallen behind the finite movement of our existence. By 
resolutely anticipating one’s end, however, the self is freed to no longer relate to others 
in such ways, and instead regards them as fellow world-constitutors, as fellow Dasein who 
are themselves in the world according to the finite movement of their care.  
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For Heidegger, then, it is the solitariness of anticipating one’s end, in the sense of an 
action that can only be carried out by me myself, that allows the self to truly care for those 
others it finds itself amidst. (344). It is such anticipatory resoluteness that
first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality… Only by 
authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be 
with one another -not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative 
fraternising in the ‘they’ and in what the ‘they’ want to undertake (344-
345).  
And it is from the spirit of this finding that we can understand what Heidegger means 
when he says that “[w]hen Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of Others” 
(344). Dasein here becomes the conscience of others, not in the sense of acting like an 
over-protective or domineering parent who stands over the other and tries to do things 
for them, but as one who, out of concern for the well-being of the others’ concern, for 
the other’s self-preservation and self-growth as a fellow world-constitutor, acts by holding 
herself back, and by practicing a certain self-restraint, so that the other might seize the 
opportunity to understand and take up the finite movement of her own being in an 
authentic way4. 
4. Conclusion:  The Limit of the World’s Well-Being 
Our study of Dasein’s authentic way of being-with others has begun to show how the 
finite self’s relations in the world are not always a matter of tit-for-tat. The self no longer 
regards the other merely in terms of what she can do or not do for my desire for success 
in the effecting of my potentiality. Rather, I now also see the other as she is, as a fellow 
Dasein who is concerned about her being and who forms the world from the finite, errant 
movement of her own potentiality-for-being.
Irene McMullin maintains that, in this concerned holding oneself back at the appropriate 
time and place, the self can serve as the silent call of conscience to another. (226)  And 
indeed we can think of numerous situations where this occurs.  For example, when a 
young girl is finishing up high-school and considering which university to attend, and looks 
to her mother for advice, or for some sense of what she herself believes she should do, 
or perhaps simply how she herself might feel were she to move far away, the thoughtful 
4 McMullin makes this point in her study of the implications of Heidegger’s thought on our everyday 
social relations.  See mcmullin 2013, 226-230.
107 
DIFFERENZ. AÑO 5, NÚMERO 4: 
JULIO DE 2018. ISSN 2386-4877, pp. 95-109
restraint displayed by the mother, which speaks without saying any-thing, which speaks 
in her pause, can alert the girl to the finite movement of her own care, as that to which 
she herself has been delivered over and which only she herself can responsibly take up 
into the future.  The restraint shown by the mother in this case is not to be confused 
with indifference, surely, or even with an outlook on the world that strongly emphasizes 
so-called self-independence or self-autonomy. For the action on the part of the mother 
is taken at considerable pains to herself. The mother would, in a sense, undoubtedly like 
to interject and ensure that her daughter makes the best possible decision on the matter. 
And yet, drawing on her own experience, on her own knowledge of how we must exist in 
this world, she acts only by holding herself back in that pause, which alerts the daughter 
to her own responsibility for her existence more than any-thing that might explicitly be 
said thereafter.
Taking such a situation into consideration, McMullin argues that the authentic being-
with the other at play here is not a reciprocal relation (225). For, continuing with our 
example, the daughter does not herself already stand in an authentic relation to her own 
care, and so does not reciprocate this authentic being-with her mother.  Yet, as Heidegger’s 
analysis of movement as the presence of Dasein’s potentiality bears out, the self, in this 
case, the young girl, is already present, and has already done something for the other, in 
this case, the mother, qua her potentiality-for-being. In her potentiality-for-being, as the 
reciprocal relation between Dasein’s suffering and enacting that opens the world’s ecstatic 
manifestation, the daughter is already present, and already acts by holding open contexts 
of significance on which the mother depends for the self-perseverance and self-growth of 
her own care. What is more, this view of the finite movement of our being in terms of a 
horizonal context of significance would serve to limit our authentic being-with others to 
those others with whom we share such contexts. While it is true that the relation between 
the two in question is not an “exact symmetry” (225), in this basic way, it is a reciprocal 
relation for all that. The mother’s authentic relation to her daughter, on Heidegger’s 
account, is thus not a gratuitous relation. In her authentic relation to the finite movement 
of her mineness, the mother’s way of relating to others remains a reciprocal relation.  
Indeed, as Frederick Olafson maintains, and as our analysis of Dasein’s mineness 
suggested earlier, in our authentic being-with others, the “distinction between self-
interest and the general well-being will simply not be at all plausible” (OlafsOn 1998, 
94). That is to say, by authentically understanding our care from its basis in the finite 
movement of our mineness, “self-interest here changes”, such that my actions are not 
undertaken for the advantage of an independent I or you, but for the preservation and 
growth of the reciprocal presence of the world in which we both share in our own way 
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(92-93). My authentic relation to the other is thus determined by a reciprocity, but not by 
one that would be calculative or egotistical. Instead, in our authentic being-with others, 
our reciprocal relations with others expands to include the finite temporality that makes 
possible our shared contexts of meaning. Such reciprocal relations thus take on a more 
holistic character. Even from this more holistic perspective, however, our relations with 
others are limited to those with whom we share a context of significance. This finding 
prompts the question as to whether it is not the case that the finite movement of our 
existence can withstand an authentic relation to others that would exceed such parameters. 
Our finite experience in the world seems to suggest that we are capable of gratuitous or 
non-reciprocal acts of self-giving. It seems that, all of a sudden and quite unexpectedly, 
the look of a stranger who stands outside our contexts of significance can nevertheless be 
intelligible to us, and that we can in turn grow into who we are in the world with others 
by responding to such radical others by gratuitously giving ourselves to them in an act of 
compassion. Such experiences seem to stand outside the scope of Heidegger’s analysis 
of the limits of care, and therefore call for further study of the essential conditions that 
determine how human beings are with one another in the world.
Bibliography
Backman, Jussi. 2005. “Divine and mortal motivation: On the movement of life in Aristotle 
and Heidegger”. Continental Philosophy Review 38: 241-261
carter, Joseph P. 2014. “Heidegger’s Sein-zum-Tode as Radicalization of Aristotles’s 
definition of Kinêsis”. Epoché: A journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3): 473-502.
Heidegger, Martin. 1995. Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1-3: On the essence and actuality of 
Force. Trans. W. Brogan and P. Warnek. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 1982. The basic problems of Phenomenology. Trans. A. Hofstadter. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and Time. Trans J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Heidegger, Martin. 1999. Ontology: The hermeneutics of facticity. Trans. J. Van Buren. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 2005. Introduction to phenomenological research. Trans. D. O. 
Dahlstrom. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
109 
DIFFERENZ. AÑO 5, NÚMERO 4: 
JULIO DE 2018. ISSN 2386-4877, pp. 95-109
Heidegger, Martin. 2001. Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Introduction into 
phenomenological research. Trans. R. Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
mcmullin, Irene. 2013. Time and the shared world: Heidegger on social relations. Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press.
OlafsOn, Frederick A. 1998. Heidegger and the ground of ethics: A study of Mitsein. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
WeBB, David. 2009. Heidegger, ethics and the practice of ontology. New York: Continuum.
